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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
PERRY PARKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20080723-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* -k "k k 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Perry's motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ]f 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue 
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 39-29). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Perry Parker appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Honorable Claudia 
Laycock, Fourth District Court, after he entered a conditional plea to possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Perry Parker was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District Court on 
June 18, 2007 with: Count 1 -possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); Count 2 -
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l); and Count 3 - having an open container of 
alcohol in a motor vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 23-1-10 (R. 2-1). 
A preliminary hearing was conducted by the Honorable Claudia Laycock on 
November 7, 2007, and Parker was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of 
probable cause (R. 20-19). 
On February 4, 2008 Parker filed a motion to suppress, alleging that all evidence 
obtained from the warrantless search of his vehicle should be suppressed, along with any 
statements he made while under custodial interrogation without being advised of his 
Miranda rights (R. 39-29). A hearing on the motion was held on March 12, 2008 and 
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Judge Lay cock concluded that the search of the vehicle was constitutional (R. 49-48). 
The State stipulated to suppression of any statements made by Parker during interrogation 
after he exited the van (R. 42-41). Written findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
signed on April 1, 2008 (R. 54-52). 
On May 14, 2008 Parker entered a plea to count 1 - possession of a controlled 
substance, amended to a third degree felony, conditioned on his right to appeal the denial 
of his motion to suppress (R. 64-58, 57). 
Parker was sentenced to a fine, 240 days in the Utah County Jail and 36 months 
probation on June 25, 2008 (R. 80-78). 
Parker filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court on July 25. 2008 (R. 92). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
1. On June 2, 2007, at about 2:00 a.m., Officer John Luke was patrolling in Provo 
Canyon when he noticed a van parked in the parking lot of the Canyon View Park (R. 
102:4-5). 
2. Because the vehicle was in the lot after the park's cufew, Officer Luke approached 
the vehicle and made contact with Perry Parker, the driver (R. 102: 5-6). 
3. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Luke observed an open container of hard 
alcohol inside the van, on the back side of the driver's seat (R. 102: 6, 7). The seal on the 
alcohol container was broken and the bottle was partially consumed (R. 102: 12). 
1
 At a hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated to the accuracy of the facts 
from Parker's suppression motion, and the trial court adopted those facts (R. 103: 7-8). 
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4. Based on the fart th;4 he observed the open container in the vehklc, Officer Luke 
had Parker exit the vehicle and Officer Luke conducted a search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle for further alcohol (R. 102: 6, 8). Luke testified that Parker's 
eyes were bloodshot (R. 102: 6). 
5. During the search for more alcohol, Officer Luke noticed a small black box on the 
floor, just directly in front of the driver's seat (R. 102: 8). Officer Luke opened the box 
and found syringes inside (Id.). He then began to question Parker about the syringes and 
learned that Parker had used the syringes to inject methamphetamine (R. 102: 8-9). 
6. At no time during this process did Officer Luke advise Parker of his Miranda 
rights (R. 102:9). 
7. After the search was concluded. Officer Luke cited Parker for an open container of 
alcohol and for possession of drug paraphernalia and Parker was released (R. 102: 9). 
8. Later, while writing his report, Officer Luke, again inspected the contents of the 
black box, wherein he discovered that one of the syringes was loaded with a clear liquid, 
which later tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 102: 10-11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the denial of Parker's motion to suppress and vacate his 
conditional guilty pleas because the scope of the permissible search under the automobile 
exception was exceeded by the Officer's search of the small black box. Accordingly, the 
evidence against him was obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure of his 
personal property. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE AGAINST PARKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE SCOPE OF THE 
PERMISSIBLE SEARCH UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION WAS EXCEEDED BY THE OFFICER'S 
SEARCH OF THE SMALL BLACK BOX 
Parker asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress obtained 
as a result of the illegal seizure and search of her person and her property. The trial court 
denied his motion to suppress, concluding that the "police search of [Parker's] van was 
justified by the automobile exception.... Thus, the police properly seized the alcohol and 
were permitted to search the passenger compartment of the van" (R. 52). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. "In general police officers may not search or 
seize without a warrant supported by probable cause. Warrantless searches and seizures 
are per se unreasonable unless they meet the criteria of an accepted exception to the 
Fourth Amendment." State v. Wright, 1999 UT App 86, ^ 7, 977 P.2d 505 (citations 
omitted). 
The automobile exception is one such acceptable exception to the warrant 
requirement. Police may search a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause 
to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence. See Maryland v. 
Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999); and California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-81, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). See also State 
v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367, ^ 13, 173 P.3d 213. Parker concedes that Officer Luke 
had probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to this exception due to his observation 
of a partially consumed bottle of h^'d r^cohol on th- bac> ride oHhc driver's seat (R. 
102: 12). 
However, 'The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile... is not defined by 
the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather it is defined by the 
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may 
be found." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.Ed.2d 
572 (1982). See also Wright 1999 UT App 86 at ^ 12. In other words, "If there is 
probable cause to search the vehicle, the officer is permitted to 'search any package 
within the vehicle that is capable of concealing the object of the search.'" United States 
v. Howe, 313 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1185 (D. Utah 2003). affdby, 139 Fed.Appx. 61 (10lh Cir. 
2005) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 939 (10lh Cir. 2001), and citing 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)). 
Parker asserts that Officer Luke's search of the small black box was outside of the scope 
of the search allowed by the automobile exception because the object of the search was 
alcohol—open containers of alcohol, and there was no basis to believe that the small 
black box was capable of concealing such alcohol 
In Wright, this Court examined the scope of searches allowed under the 
automobile exception as it related to the smell of marijuana. The searching Officer in 
Wright smelled an odor of raw marijuana coming from the vehicle. 1999 UT App 86 at ^ 
4. The Officer then searched the trunk of the vehicle and discovered a duffel bag 
containing twenty-five pounds of marijuana. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that 
the Officer lacked probable cause to search the trunk. Id. at ^ 5. 
On appeal this Court, following the lead of the Tenth Circuit, drew a distinction 
between the allowable scope of a search under the automobile exception for the odor of 
burnt marijuana and raw marijuana. This Court, quoting from United States v. Downs, 
151 F.3d 1301 (1(T Cir. 1998), concluded there is u ,a common sense distinction between 
the smells of burnt and raw marijuana based on the imperative that the scope of a 
warrantless search "is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is 
probable cause to believe that it may be found."'" Wright, 1999 UT App 86 at |^ 13 
(quoting Downs, 151 F.3d at 1303, and Ross, 456 U.S. 824, 102 S.Ct. at 2172). This 
Court adopted the further explanation of the Tenth Circuit in Downs: 
The smell of burnt marijuana is generally consistent with personal use of 
marijuana in the passenger compartment of an automobile. In such a case, 
therefore, there is no fair probability that the trunk of the car contains marijuana 
and an officer must limit the search of the compartment absent corroborating 
evidence of contraband. When, on the other hand, an officer encounters, as was 
the case here, the overpowering smell of raw marijuana, there is a fair probability 
that the car is being used to transport large quantities of marijuana and that the 
marijuana has been secreted in places other than the passenger compartment. 
Accordingly, in such circumstances, a search of the trunk is appropriate. 
Wright, 1999 UT App 86 at 1f 13 (quoting Downs, 151 F.3dat 1303). This Court 
concluded that because what the Officer smelled was raw marijuana, he was entitled to 
search the trunk. Id. at ^ 14. 
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Parker asserts the scope of a;: illownble probable cause search for drugs is 
different than for open containers of alcohol. Drugs, drug paraphernalia and equipment 
can be secreted in just about any containers or parts of the vehicle, whereas open 
containers of alcohol are far more limited in where it is likely to be found. Accordingly, 
Parker asserts that there was no fair probability that the small box located on the floor 
contained alcohol and accordingly its search was outside the allowable scope of the 
automobile exception and the trial court erred in concluding that the search of the box 
was pennissible under the automobile exception, and that all evidence located in the box 
should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the denial of his motion to suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand this case to the 
Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20™ day of April, 2009. 
Margaret r. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PERRY PARKER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 071402548 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence obtained 
by the State of Utah in the instant case that resulted in the Defendant's arrest on June 2, 2007. 
Having already Ruled and Ordered in Court on March 12, 2008 that the Motion to Suppress be 
denied, the Court now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On June 2,2007, at about 2:00am, Officer John Luke was patrolling in Provo 
Canyon when he noticed a van parked in the parking lot of the Canyon View Park. 
2. Because the vehicle was in the lot after the park's curfew, Officer Luke 
approached the vehicle and made contact with the Defendant driver. 
3. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Luke observed an open container of hard 
alcohol inside the van, on the back side of the driver's seat. 
4. Based on the fact that he observed the open container in the vehicle, Officer Luke 
had the Defendant exit the vehicle and Officer Luke conducted a search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle for further alcohol. 
5. During his search, Officer Luke noticed a small black box on the floor, just 
directly in front of the driver's seat. Officer Luke opened the box and found 
syringes inside. He then began to question the Defendant about the syringes and 
learned that the Defendant used the syringes to inject methamphetamine. 
6. At no time during this process did Officer Luke advise the Defendant of his 
Miranda rights. 
7. After the search was concluded, Officer Luke cited the Defendant for an open 
container of alcohol and for possession of drug paraphernalia and the Defendant 
was released. 
8. Later, while writing his report, Officer Luke again inspected the contents of the black 
box, wherein he discovered that one of the syringes was loaded with a clear liquid, 
which later tested positive for methamphetamine. 
9. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Luke charged the Defendant with 
Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone, a second-degree felony, and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug-Free Zone, a class-A misdemeanor, and 
Possession of an Open Container of Alcohol in a Motor Vehicle, a class-B 
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misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officer had reasonable suspicion to approach the Defendant's vehicle because it 
was after curfew in a Provo city park. 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code section 41 -6a-526(3), the officer had reasonable suspicion to 
investigate the open container of alcohol that he saw in plain view in the driver's seat 
back pocket. This reasonable suspicion is further bolstered by the officer's ability to 
enforce Provo city ordinances, which prohibit alcohol at city parks. 
3. Police do not have to arrest a suspect before the automobile exception of the warrant 
requirement can be utilized. The police search of the Defendant's van was justified 
by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because the van was readily 
mobile and this was an exigent circumstance. Thus, the police properly seized the 
alcohol and were permitted to search the passenger compartment of the van. 
4. Because the officer questioned the Defendant without reading him his Miranda rights 
while the Defendant was being detained, any subsequent statements made by the 
Defendant are inadmissible at trial in the State's case-in-chief. 
5. Based on the foregoing, with the exception of suppressing the Defendant's 
statements, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
SIGNED this feSKiay of fl^rd, , 2008. 
JM^Aj * 
Judge Claudia Layw 
